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Abstract 
The study presents an overview of the impact of the main investment tools 
of the EU budget. The focus is on the increasing role of the financial 
instruments, which are fundamentally changing the budget’s nature and 
reach. Through these instruments, the EU can invest more efficiently in 
more areas and mobilise a multiple of funds. The EU budget has the 
potential to influence the European economy much more than its modest 
size in terms of GDP may suggest. 
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of the EU budget: 
Driving force or drop in the ocean? 
Jorge Núñez Ferrer and Moni Katarivas * 
CEPS Special Report No. 86 / April 2014 
Executive Summary  
Over the years, the EU budget has been the focus of many negative and positive claims 
concerning its contribution to the European economy. Opinions range from it being wasteful, 
to it being essential for Europe’s future. The EU budget is also small in size as share of GNI 
or of national public expenditure, i.e. 1% and 2%, respectively.  
The mixed reviews on the EU budget are not surprising. Europe is very eclectic and consists 
of 28 member states; most of the funds (approximately 80%) are managed by national 
administrations, with locally determined plans and priorities. The result is a rich mosaic of 
EU budgetary impacts, some very positive, others highly ineffective. This opens the door to a 
variety of claims from both camps – supporters and detractors. The budget’s size is, 
however, deceptive. First, because the EU budget, with the exception of agricultural policy, 
is mainly used for capital investments in specific areas and cannot cover operational costs. Its 
contribution is much more than symbolic, and is in fact very substantial for some of the 
policy areas it supports. To put it into perspective, approximately half of the EU budget is 
‘direct investment’ which is aimed at gross fixed-capital formation (i.e. mainly 
infrastructures). This sum – €53.9 billion, according to Eurostat – represents 15% of the total 
EU direct public investment and thus is far from being a mere drop in the ocean. With the 
concentration on poorer member states, the share for some regions is thus quite significant 
indeed. Similarly, while the EU R&D share of expenditure as a percentage of the total is only 
5%, the fact that this funding excludes many capital expenditures that member states cover 
(e.g. buildings, existing machinery, non R&D linked staff, etc.) means that EU funding is 
essential in some EU priority areas of research.  
In addition, much of the EU budget is either co-financed or supporting financial instruments 
that attract a multiple of funds from financial institutions and other investors. The funding 
mobilised by the EU budget in the Multiannual Financial Framework is very substantial, 
leading to an ‘EU mobilised size’ of funds of €2 trillion’, or 2% points of GDP, i.e. two times 
the investment. 
But beyond the mobilisation of funds, the actual core of the matter is the budget’s impact, i.e. 
its contribution to the achievement of the EU policy objectives, including economic growth. 
The incentives created by the EU budget are essential to the implementation of many of the 
EU’s commonly agreed objectives in several areas, in particular environmental protection 
and energy. It also operates as an instrument to align strategic planning across EU member 
states, improve administrative capacity and increase knowledge transfer. These ‘secondary’ 
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or ‘soft’ impacts can have substantial effects on the EU as a whole, but are neither sufficiently 
recognised nor measured.  
In the area of RDI support, the economic impact of the EU budget has been estimated to be 
considerable, due to the economies of scale that pooling resources for research at EU level 
can generate. The increasing collaboration with industry, which fosters a better link between 
research results and commercialisation, is also promising. The impact factor of past 
Framework Programmes for research, in terms of value added for the business sector, was 
estimated to be 13 times the initial EU investment. With the current reforms this should still 
increase significantly, meaning that the value of Horizon 2020 would under a conservative 
assumption exceed €1 trillion. 
The EU budget has proven its value added and importance in the programmes of support to 
SMEs and in particular to innovative businesses. The credit crunch has significantly limited 
the availability of financing for SMEs, and the EU support schemes channelled through the 
European Investment Fund play a critical role in many member states. The main role of the 
funds is to leverage funding for SMEs particularly through Guarantees, but also to share 
risks through equity instruments. The leverage ranges from 6 times the EU support for 
innovative businesses, to 30 for other SMEs. With less than €1 billion, the expected total 
leverage approximates €18 billion. The economic effects of promoting SMEs are highly 
positive, and the returns to the EU in terms of economic growth and employment are a 
multiple of the investment. 
In the area of Cohesion policy the EU budget provides a key instrument to foster EU 
objectives across EU regions and countries. The size of the policy (€355 billion for 2007-2013) 
goes beyond its EU contribution, together with leveraged funds the total investment 
increases to €700 billion. The economic effect has been estimated to be in the range of four 
times the EU contribution, or €1.4 trillion. For the future, the improved strategic planning 
requirements and implementation rules are expected to improve considerably the economic 
impact of the policy. In addition, the expanded use of financial instruments and the 
possibility to combine different sources of finance for projects should strengthen the policy. 
The Cohesion policy’s impact on strategic planning and knowledge transfer will most likely 
have an important positive economic effect in the long-term. 
In the area of Trans-European Networks the EU budget is essential to provide the necessary 
basis to achieve its objectives, which are essential to realise the potential of the single market. 
The results have largely been disappointing due to the lack of significant resources from the 
EU budget. By 2012 the EU budget leveraged €44 billion with a €7 billion investment, which 
is far too little when taking into account an estimated infrastructure need in transport and 
energy of €1.8 trillion. The required member states contribution of €285 billion has not been 
delivered due to the economic crisis and its impact on national budgets. An important share 
of the leverage originates from the LGTT (Loan Guarantee Instrument for Trans-European 
Transport) financial instrument. This instrument managed to raise €12 billion in capital by 
2012 with an initial €400 million (half by the EU budget and half by the EIB). This is a 
leverage factor of the instrument of 30 (60 times the EU budget share of €200 million), which 
is higher than initially estimated.  
Based on the experience of the LGTT financial instrument, the EU has launched the Project 
Bond Initiative, a high-leverage instrument for large infrastructures. The pilot phase during 
2013-2015 is expected to raise over €4 billion in capital, with an initial €230 million allocation. 
The CEF should be able to provide much higher levels of funding and expected to raise 
around 20 times the EU budget element, i.e. €3.3 billion (the maximum allowed in the 
Connecting Europe Facility could thus provide €66 billion in funding). The €33 billion 
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allocated to the Connecting Europe Facility are expected by the Commission to generate an 
investment 25 times the sum (€850 billion), an ambitious and probably excessive expectation. 
Nevertheless, even with half of the leverage the sums are substantial. Most likely FIs will 
leverage more and grants less than expected. 
Other areas where the financial instruments are expected to lead to substantial benefits are 
energy and external action. The programmes for energy (such as Intelligent Energy Europe, 
the European Energy Efficiency Fund and the Marguerite Fund) have proven their leverage 
capacity and value added. Less than €1 billion in EU support is associated to a leverage of 
€25 billion. 
In the area of external action, the EU’s contribution to financial instruments (blending 
facilities) of €1.3 billion has led to a leverage of €41 billion by 2012. This is a significant 
addition to the EU’s external action objectives. 
For the period 2013-2020, the sum of the total leverage of the EU budget in the areas analysed 
in this report exceeds the size of the entire EU budget. In addition, the economic impact of 
EU interventions is estimated to be a multiple of the size of the budget. The RDI policy, for 
example, which amounted to around 5% of the budget in the 2007-2013 MFF period, has had 
an impact estimated to be higher than the whole EU budget, i.e. 0.5% of the EU GDP generated 
around 1% in additional GDP. The Cohesion Policy with 0.4% of EU GDP generated another 
1% GDP net impact in addition. In total a net impact of 2% of GDP from about half the EU 
budget or 0.5% of EU GDP.  Much of this impact has long-term implications raising the 
steady state level of GDP, i.e. the base physical capital stock of GDP level and basis of future 
growth. For Horizon 2020 the leverage could be higher than 1, this means a total investment 
of over twice the EU budget or 2% GDP. The net economic benefit could reach 2.5%-3% of 
GDP (from the Cohesion and Competitiveness investments of the budget equivalent to 0.5% 
of GDP). These figures are rough and partial estimations emerging from an overview of 
evaluations and studies and should not be taken at face value, but reflect the importance of 
the budget. 
It is certainly possible to conclude that the EU budget is not “a drop in the ocean”; it is a 
truly important force in the EU. Looking at past performance, the EU budget has been an 
influential facilitator of integration in the EU. For the future, the budget can become a 
driving force in the areas it supports. The extent to which it will achieve its potential will 
largely depend on the quality of planning and implementation by national authorities. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the years, the EU budget has been the focus of many negative and positive claims 
concerning its contribution to the European economy. Declarations range from its “being a 
financial waste” to “being essential for Europe’s future”. The EU budget’s capacity to 
contribute to the EU’s economy is strongly called into question, also due to the impacts of the 
financial crisis in those countries that were the main beneficiaries of the funds, i.e. the so-
called ‘Cohesion countries’. According to some critics, the EU budget contributions have not 
led to more resilient and better economies, and have been therefore largely misallocated. 
The mixed reviews on the EU budget are not surprising. Europe is very eclectic and consists 
of 28 member states; most (approximately 80%) of the funds are managed by national 
administrations, with locally-determined plans and priorities. The result is a rich mosaic of 
EU budget impacts, some very positive, others highly ineffective. This opens the door to a 
variety of claims from both camps, supporters and detractors. 
There is no doubt that some of the EU budget’s expenditure priorities were questionable, 
and the well-known 2003 Sapir report highlighted its weaknesses. The success of the EU 
budget, however, is largely the result of local strategies, at least in the area of regional policy. 
Due to the increasing realisation that there needs to be a better focus towards long-term 
sustainable growth in line with EU priorities, the EU has strengthened earmarking and 
conditionality, and has expanded the use of the so-called ‘innovative financial instruments’.  
What matters for the future is not how the EU budget has performed so far, but whether it 
has the potential to contribute to the European construction and its long-term economic 
welfare? Would it matter if the EU budget were abolished given that it only represents 1% of 
EU GNI or 2% of EU public expenditure, which is hardly an amount able to make a large 
impact by itself?  
This report seeks to provide some answers on the potential of the EU budget, taking into 
account its limitation in size and structure and the existing policy decisions. It provides a 
first, even if incomplete answer, on the added-value of the EU budget. The report briefly 
reviews the impact of the EU budget and analyses its future potential contribution, in 
particular as a driver for long–term sustainable economic growth. It is important to very 
carefully differentiate between the impacts of the EU budget in the past due the way member 
states have implemented it, and its actual potential. Various factors may radically change the 
impact of the EU budget: First, the reorientation of the EU budget and the reinforced 
strategic requirements, the earmarking and the conditionalities, and second, the increased 
use of the so- called innovative financial instruments, aimed at leveraging private funds for 
objectives of central importance to the EU.  
This document will focus primarily on the role and potential of the (innovative) financial 
instruments (FIs) that support the EU budget in the form of equity and guarantees to 
leverage public or private finance. The FIs have the potential to radically change the nature 
and reach of the EU budget over time. The introduction of financial instruments combining 
EU budget support with loans by the EIB Group (European Investment Bank and European 
Investment Fund), as well as from other financial institutions, is seen as one way of 
expanding the reach of the EU budget and increasing its effectiveness. The financial and 
sovereign debt crisis has also increased the need for new innovative financial solutions to 
address a weakening credit market for public infrastructures, SMEs (small- and medium-size 
enterprises) and RD&I (research, development and innovation). While EU level financial 
instruments cannot replace the vacuum created by the credit crunch and the sovereign debt 
crisis, they can offer specific support in areas with a European value added, as well as 
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significant long-term returns in terms of growth and jobs creation. Moreover, these 
instruments create a new space for collaboration between institutions and levels of decision-
making, facilitating the pooling of resources and the development of common standards 
across the EU. These indirect implications of well-devised mechanisms can potentially create 
considerable efficiencies of scale.  
This report provides an overview of the rationale and impacts of the EU budget, and within 
it the role of the innovative financial instruments. It shows that the EU budget has had a 
considerable impact and can be an important additional motor for the future of the EU, far 
from the criticisms of being “a drop in the ocean”. However, its effectiveness will still greatly 
depend on the decisions of member states and local authorities, and the budget will have to 
continuously adapt and reform to better fit the different needs. The EU budget’s past and 
future impacts are thus conditional on what beneficiaries do with the funds. With the 
financial crisis attracting attention on new models of financing and the need for longer-term 
and sustainable impacts, there is a chance for the EU budget to realise more of its intrinsic 
potential. In fact, the European Union’s objectives and aspirations have increased 
considerably in the last two decades, while the budget of the Union has fallen in real terms as 
a percentage to GNI since the 1990s. The EU requires a budget, if not bigger, certainly better 
allocated and managed than it has been to date. 
This report focuses mainly on the investment policies of the EU budget, e.g. the research and 
cohesion budget. However, to their exceptional nature, the financial instruments for external 
action are also addressed. It does not cover, for example, the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) and its rural development arm. Agricultural policy is the only fully common policy 
required by the Treaty and is not designed as an investment policy in the way the research 
and cohesion policies are. The CAP is an important as well as controversial policy, and an 
analysis goes beyond the scope of this paper.  
2. Impacts of the EU Budget Expenditures on Europe’s Development 
This chapter is not designed to give a detailed assessment of the impact of the EU budget, 
but rather to offer a general overview, and to discuss some strengths and weaknesses of the 
EU budget. Generally, studies on the budget have focused on the impact of economic growth 
of EU funds, but the EU budget has a number of other functions and objectives. We can 
summarise the objectives as: 
 Achieving regional convergence  
 Increasing economic growth 
 Achieving EU targets and objectives 
Evaluations of EU policy have yielded mixed results on the first objective. From a theoretical 
point of view, regional convergence in GDP is not achievable as the endogenous potential of 
regions is different.1 It is not surprising that the main convergence process in the EU has 
happened at national rather than regional level.  
As concerns the EU level growth objective, there is some evidence that the EU budget has 
induced higher economic growth in the beneficiary countries, and this should further 
                                                   
1 GDP is a measure of productive capacity at local level, not income which is addressed by national 
social policies. GDP and growth equalisation is not possible as growth potentials are different. 
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increase in the next financial perspective. Key models looking at the cohesion policy2 show 
positive impacts of cohesion policy on growth in the beneficiary countries, compared to a 
counterfactual scenario with no EU budget support. This is central to justify EU budget 
expenditures for competitiveness, cohesion and trans-European infrastructures. 
Approximately half of the EU budget is ‘direct investment’ which is aimed at gross fixed-
capital formation (i.e. mainly infrastructures), or €53.9 billion according to Eurostat, 
representing 15% of the EU direct public investment.3 Similarly, while the EU R&D share of 
expenditure to total is only 5%, the fact that this funding excludes many capital expenditures 
which member states cover (e.g. buildings, existing machinery, non-R&D linked staff, etc.), 
this means that EU funding is essential in some EU priority areas of research. It is very 
important that the EU shows a positive growth impact.  
These results include considerable positive growth effects for Greece, Spain, Portugal and 
Italy (which means that they would have been even worse off without the support of the EU 
budget today), However the models show in some cases large discrepancies in their results: 
for example Quest shows a long term 2-3% GDP impact for some countries, where Hermin 
gives a result inferior to 0.5% for the 2000-2006 financial framework. For the 2007-2013 
period impacts are all positive, but this time with higher estimated impacts during the 
period in the Hermin model. The largest impacts are all expected to take place in the new 
member states, with most new member states achieving GDP rates between 2-5% higher 
than in a ‘no-support’ scenario (Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Hermin and Quest model results for Cohesion Policy 2007-2016 
 
Source: Bradley and Untiedt (2012), p. 16.  
Employment is also assessed, and while the Hermin model predicts considerable 
employment effects for 2014, Quest shows very little impact. Nevertheless, the results are 
positive in all cases. Unfortunately, the models tell us very little beyond GDP and some 
employment effects. 
                                                   
2 The Hermin model was developed by the Economic and Social Research Unit in Dublin and used 
extensively in analysing cohesion policy impacts. Quest is the main model used by the Commission’s 
Economic and Financial Affairs Directorate General. 
3 A. Illés, R. Sauter and J. Núñez Ferrer (2014), “Financing Europe 2020: a consolidated view”, Report 
to the Committee of the Regions (http://tinyurl.com/pma2hkc). 
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In the area of RDI, an OECD study that estimated the impacts on the economy of the EU 6th 
and 7th Framework Programme. Each Euro spent in those programmes have increased the 
Value Added in the business sector by €13.4  
The EU budget is, however, much more than just a transfer for GDP generation, in particular 
since the Multiannual Financial Framework is being used to influence national spending 
priorities towards a number of EU objectives. Many non-financial impacts have an important 
bearing on social and environmental conditions, which lead to welfare increases. The long-
term impacts of the EU budget on national strategies and administrative capacity is also 
difficult to evaluate in such models. The exercise of drafting national and regional strategies 
for EU funds might considerably facilitate the capacity of member states to draft coherent 
national reform strategies for the European Semester. In addition, the EU budget has 
important impacts in the transfer of best practices across the EU, as administrations of 
member states, candidate and associated countries introduce similar practices. For many 
regional authorities, the EU budget also offers the possibility to demonstrate new systems 
and subsequently mainstream them if successful. This test-bed nature, breaking up 
established administrative rigidities at national and regional level, may well have 
considerable implications, even if this is difficult to estimate.5 Without the EU budget much 
of what is taken for granted would not exist. 
This does not mean that the EU budget is well and sound, and much still needs to change. 
The presently concluded Multiannual Financial Framework 2007-2013 and the one for 2014-
2020 have introduced radical changes to the way the funds are programmed in EU member 
states and regions. Earmarking and integrated planning have transformed the EU budget 
support from a sectoral and cohesion oriented transfer to a powerful EU policy 
implementation tool. With Europe 2020, the EU budget has become fundamental to incite 
regions and member states to focus on the Europe 2020 flagship objectives. In addition, some 
fundamental changes are in motion with the increasing use of FIs. The EU budget is 
promoting a key change in the way administrations at all levels plan and finance many areas 
of public spending. Through the FIs, the weight of the EU budget interventions will increase 
considerably, not due to the direct transfers, but due to the leverage effects. Indirectly the 
budget could see a doubling of its financial weight (including items which do not create a 
leverage, e.g. direct payments in the agricultural sector). This does not only increase 
considerably the EU budget influence, but it will also change significantly the actual impact 
of the budget across countries.  
3. Rationale for the Expanded Use of Financial Instruments 
An argument that is often raised in favour of the use of financial instruments is that they 
have a high leverage effect, i.e. they attract a much higher level of private or public funding 
than the EU contribution. While this is true, financial instruments are not a panacea and 
cannot replace grants and increase investment single-handedly. Financial instruments are 
debt instruments and as such have a specific role. If they can substitute traditional grants in 
certain areas, it mostly means that the EU was subsidising in excess such projects to start 
with.  
                                                   
4 Presented in Box 10, p. 30 of the Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the impact 
assessment of the Horizon 2020 proposals (SEC(2011) 1427 final) of 30 November 2011. 
5 Authors’ assessment based on discussions with regional authorities and experience in local projects, 
cases from France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Bulgaria. 
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Financial instruments are a complementary tool, which in some areas of intervention are 
better suited and more powerful than grants. 
 
 
3.1 Economic rationale for using innovative financial instruments 
Projects with high European added value and which can potentially raise revenue to be self-
financing, may initially need support from financial instruments, because they either do not 
generate sufficient revenue to cover the interests of a loan, or because the risks are too high 
according to the assessment of private investors.  
FIs are thus primarily a risk mitigation tool for financial institutions and investors, as they 
take over some of the risks associated with any given project. This affects the cost-benefit 
balance of projects for the investors, enabling projects and sector investment programmes 
which would otherwise have not taken place.  
The Financial instruments have the positive feature of allowing a better allocation of scarce 
public resources, by differentiating between projects where grants are needed and those 
where guaranteed loans or equity would suffice. The recently published financial regulation6 
now allow for a combination of support instruments to develop a project. This allows also to 
combine traditional grants to support non-bankable aspects of a project, while a bankable but 
risky revenue generation aspect can benefit from FIs. 
FIs allow for a better allocation of scarce public resources, leaving grants for activities of 
economic and social value that cannot be revenue-generating, while simultaneously allowing 
for a larger number of public programmes with the same budget allocation.  
3.2 Potential forms of financial instruments 
FIs can take many forms, such as loan guarantees, venture or risk capital (seed money, 
equity, quasi-equity or mezzanine loans) or interest rate subsidies (used in external action 
                                                   
6 Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council. 
of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing 
Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 (OJ L 298, 26.10.2012, p.1). 
Box. 1 Definition of Financial Instruments (FIs), leverage and multiplier effect 
Financial Instruments (FIs) are defined in Financial Regulation, p. 39, as measures of 
“financial support provided from the budget in order to address one or more specific policy objectives by 
way of loans, guarantees, equity or quasi-equity investments or participations, or other risk-bearing 
instruments, possibly combined with grants”. 
 The EU budget can offer funds to support loans by the EIB or other financial institutions. 
 Guarantees offer support to loans to reduce investors’ risks by covering the first losses of 
projects. 
 Equity aims to provide finance for early growth-stage investments in businesses and to 
boost the EU venture capital market. 
Leverage in this report represents all additional funds from third parties, public or private, 
which are mobilised by the EU budget funds.  
The multiplier effect is the economic impact generated from supported project, including 
indirect impacts not directly related to the activity. 
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programmes). Figure 2 depicts the flow from the EU budget support to the final beneficiary. 
Some of the support can be paid directly to beneficiaries, such as technical assistance 
programmes, considered also financial instruments, due to their direct link to raise funding 
and reduce project risks. For completeness, grants are also included in the figure, as they can 
be combined with FIs, and contribute in reducing the costs of a project, as well as the 
financial risks for the investor. 
Figure 2. Understanding different forms of financial instruments 
 
Source: Authors own configuration. 
EU funds (maybe complemented by other public funds) are then used as equity and debt 
instruments either through financial institutions, or through holding funds than may be set 
up by national managing authorities (MAs). 
For the 2007-2013 Financial Framework there were 24 FIs: 10 internal instruments managed 
by the European Commission centrally or jointly with a financial institution, 3 instruments 
under shared management as part of the Cohesion Policy (thus mainly under the control of 
national authorities), and 13 external instruments. A detailed description of these 
instruments is available in the Annex.  
3.3 Number and size of financial instruments in the 2014-2020 MFF 
For the period 2014-2020, the new regulations open up considerably the use of financial 
instruments in all policy areas, and allow them to be combined with other instruments, such 
as grants. This means for example that FIs for SMEs (for example loans guaranteed by the 
EU) can co-finance a project or can allow co-financing of infrastructures that benefit from a 
grant. This is important given the credit crunch. It is also important because in a number of 
poorer member states one of the only sources of private lending for SMEs, and in particular 
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innovative SMEs, is through loans supported by EU financial instruments. The former rules 
led to illogical situations whereby, for example, a firm won a EU grant for 50% of a project 
but could not find any lender to cover the remaining investment. 
The most important financial instruments will be associated to the Competitiveness and 
Cohesion programmes, and to external action, but will also be found in rural development 
policy, and in the environmental LIFE+ programme. This report will concentrate only on the 
Competitiveness and Cohesion programmes, where the FIs are most significant, and on 
external action, given their rapid increase in that sector.  
The 2014-2020 MFF regulations also consolidate the financial instruments, developing a more 
coherent approach and correcting for inconsistencies (e.g. same beneficiary targeted by two 
different funds for the same objective). These are presented in Figure 3. 
Figure 3. Financial instruments of the 2014-2020 MFF 
 
Source: DG ECFIN – it excludes FIs that not in the competitiveness and cohesion policies. 
4. Impact and Potential of the EU Budget in RDI 
According to the economic theory of fiscal federalism, Research, Development and 
Innovation (RDI) is better managed and financed at EU level.7 In the area of RDI,8 the need 
for a central budget is well documented, as the potential economies of scale are very large.  
The EU budget’s role in R&D has seen an important change over the last decades, from a 
policy focusing on open calls for support to fundamental research, to an instrument of 
industrial policy. It is now generally recognised that the economic welfare of European 
nations depends on long-term growth and sustained industrial competitiveness. This is 
                                                   
7 For an overview: J. Núñez Ferrer and Filippa Figueira (2011), “Achieving Europe’s R&D Objectives: 
Delivery tools and the role of the EU Budget”, Report No. 6, SIEPS, Sweden. 
8 The expression ‘RDI’ is used here, as it is more appropriate than the more restrictive term R&D, as it 
includes non research-based innovation. 
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achievable through the development of high added value goods and services which require 
continuous investment in RDI. 
The Seventh Framework Programme (FP7) for the programming period 2007–2013 had a 
budget of just over €50 billion for its interventions. The follow up Horizon 2020 program has 
seen its budget increase to €70.2 billion. Although the budget represents less than 5% of total 
government expenditure on research in the EU, it has a significant impact in the specific 
areas in which it intervenes (e.g. in energy research a third of the public research budget is 
financed by the EU). The Financial Instrument of the FP7 assistance in the area of RDI at EU 
level provides important advantages: 
 It promotes cross-border collaboration and economies of scale, thereby capturing the full 
capacity within the EU by improving cooperation and coordination; 
 It addresses RDI projects that are too big for any one member state or requires 
coordinated actions among member states to provide value;  
 It copes with the risks associated with new RDI projects and helps to reduce the risk of 
duplicating national or regional initiatives implemented in an uncoordinated fashion; 
and 
 It also allows for transfer of knowledge and the build up of new capabilities in institutes 
participating in collaborative cross border research. 
Through the Framework Programmes, the EU principally offered grants with the objective to 
strengthen industrial competitiveness and to meet the research needs of other EU policies, 
thereby contributing to the creation of a knowledge-based society. RDI support should 
contribute towards promoting growth, sustainable development and environmental 
protection. FP7 promoted excellence in scientific and technological research, development 
and demonstration through its programmes. An OECD model has been used by the 
European Commission to estimate the impact of the EU’s 6th and 7th Framework Programme: 
for each Euro spent the Value Added in the business sector is estimated to have increased by 
€13,9 which can be considered a very good result. 
A 2010 interim evaluation of the Framework Programme identified concrete positive effects 
of the FP7 including a wide diversity and high quality of projects under both Cooperation 
and People programmes, the establishment of research infrastructure, and leverage in 
promoting national research efforts.  
However, one of the central weaknesses of EU’s FPs has been the low level of private sector 
involvement and the lack of market deployment of successful research outputs. Figure 4 
shows the rationale for support beyond traditional academic RDI. For many research 
outputs, which can potentially lead to new products, public grant support does not cover the 
high costs of testing at industrial scale and of marketing that would be required to launch the 
innovation. These costs are often referred to as the ‘valley of death’ in the literature or the 
‘technology death risk area’.  
To bridge the gap between academic research, and large scale (real life) demonstration and 
the market, FP7 offered additional support, in particular through a new Financial Instrument 
called the Risk Sharing Finance Facility (RSFF). The RSFF is a guarantee instrument 
supported by European Investment Bank (EIB) loans, and is an important instrument to 
bridge the gap. RSFF provides risk capital aimed at covering potential losses in the financial 
                                                   
9 Presented in Box 10 of p. 10 of the Commission staff working paper accompanying the impact 
assessment of the Horizon 2020 proposals (SEC(2011) 1427 final) of 30 November 2011. 
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sector from RDI investments over the advanced stages of innovation, demonstration and 
deployment. It supports private projects with a high-risk profile to become bankable.  
By investing in high-risk projects that would otherwise not be implemented, the RSFF aims 
to ensure that the additionality principle is preserved. The RSFF’s expert group evaluation 
concludes that there is no evidence of a crowding out of other national/private financial 
sources, but rather a complementarity. The demand for RSFF R&D funding is much higher 
than what is provided by the market. The high leverage factor (in excess of 10) has significant 
impact on the EU innovative economy – with €1 billion by the EU budget and an equivalent 
amount by the EIB, the RSFF was expected at its inception to raise private risk capital in the 
value of approximately €10 billion over the 2007–13 period. In its mid-term evaluation report 
of 2010, the EIB noted that the leverage achieved as of end 2009 reached factor 14, triggering 
some EUR 16.2 billion of investments in research and innovation. In 2010, the European 
Commission also introduced the Risk Sharing Instrument (RSI) to cater for the special 
financing needs of innovative SMEs (this is described in more detail in chapter 5).  
Figure 4. Technology cycle and financial needs 
 
Source: Núñez Ferrer et al. (2011), SET-Plan, from concept to Successful Implementation, CEPS Task Force 
Report, May, p. 24. 
Innovation is at the core of long-term economic growth in the European Union. RDI is one of 
the most suitable areas of investment at European level. This allows to pool resources and to 
improve coordination across the EU, to avoid duplication and to generate economies of scale. 
It also allows for large collaborative projects to emerge, which no member state would be 
able to finance by itself.  
In general, providing access to risk capital is a promising and key success factor. The RSFF 
has started at a moment where investment in R&D has been affected by the crisis, providing 
a welcome financial injection in an area of highest priority for the EU.  
There is some evidence that the actions during the 2007-2013 MFF have had an impact. Since 
2009, and despite the financial crisis, the share of RDI investment in the GDP of the EU has 
crossed the level of 2% of GDP for the first time and is steadily increasing. RDI investment 
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tends to be sensitive to downturns, but the policy emphasis on RDI as an important element 
of the sustainability of Europe’s economy seems to have had a considerable effect. 
For the next programming period 2014-20 the EU, Horizon 2020 will become the biggest EU 
Research and Innovation programme to date with nearly €70.2 billion of funding available 
over 7 years (2014 to 2020). Together with a streamlining of the process, and a more focused 
approach, Horizon 2020 should increase the value added it generates. The goal is to ensure 
Europe produces world-class science, removes barriers to innovation and makes it easier for 
the public and private sectors to work together in delivering innovation. The objective of 
new FI is to complete and further develop the European Research Area and to create a 
genuine single market for knowledge, research and innovation. 
The Horizon 2020 programme envisages to set aside €4 billion for financial instruments. 
Given the high leverage of the RSFF and RSI, the financial instruments’ leverage may reach 
over €40 billion, nearly doubling by itself the research budget. If the funds recovered were to 
be reused (revolving funds), the leverage would be increased even further. 
Despite the importance of Horizon 2020 and of public funding support in general, it is 
important to point out that it is not only funding that promotes progress in innovation, but 
also the regulatory environment and the macroeconomic conditions. The share of public 
investment in RDI in the EU is not very different from the levels in the US or Japan, but the 
challenges arise in the private sector.10 Much of the private RDI investment is performed by 
companies operating internationally, and those based in the EU can easily shift their RDI 
operations and market launch to other regions. The environment for commercial RDI may 
well not be optimal in the EU and attention should also be paid to this factor. The European 
Commission also warns that quality of funding is more important than quantity.11 
 
 
 
                                                   
10 K. Uppenberg (2009), R&D in Europe, Expenditures across Sectors, Regions and Firm Sizes, CEPS-EIB 
special report, Brussels. 
11 Box 3, p. 10, European Commission staff Working Paper accompanying the impact assessment of 
the Horizon 2020 proposals (SEC(2011) 1427 final) of 30 November 2011. 
Box 2. Contribution of EU RDI support 
Leverage: The grants have limited leverage due to the high co-financing rate by the EU. For 
the RSFF however the leverage has been estimated to be in the order of 1-14, which would 
mean for the present period an estimated total of €14 billion. With a similar leverage the RSFF 
could potentially generate over €50 billion for Horizon 2020, nearly doubling the innovation 
funds of the EU budget and directly investing in the economic potential of Europe.  
European Value Added: EU-level RDI is of a high European Value Added due to the strong 
economies of scale and efficiency gains it provides. The multiplier effect on the economy is 
expected to be very high. Assuming that the OECD estimates are upheld, the total value 
added for business would reach €650 billion, which is probably much higher under Horizon 
2020. The export, employment and growth effects are significant, worth a 5.6% of higher 
steady state level of GDP in the long-run. 
Additionality: The need for risk capital is large in Europe, which is lagging behind its 
international competitors in private and public risk capital. The demand gap is considered 
substantial and instruments like the RSFF are needed. 
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5. Impact and Potential of the EU Budget and its Financial Instruments 
for Business Creation 
SMEs are a backbone of European economy. The more than 20 million small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) in the EU represent 99% of businesses, and are a key driver for economic 
growth, innovation, employment and social integration.12 They provide two out of three of 
the private sector jobs and contribute to more than half of the total value added created by 
businesses in the EU.13 Therefore, the European Commission provides special policy 
intervention instruments for SMEs in collaboration with the EIB and the European 
Investment Fund (EIF).  
The European Commission is well aware that supporting SMEs with adequately developed 
Innovative Financial Instruments has and will have significant beneficial impact on the EU 
economy, and more specifically on the Europe 2020 objective for more jobs and higher 
growth. 
The financial crisis and the credit crunch have strongly reduced for lending sources for SMEs 
reasonable capital cost, particularly for those undertaking innovative but riskier projects 
even with high-growth potential. Thus, the EU FIs for SMEs have an important role to play 
to promote business and entrepreneurship and thus generate growth and employment. 
SMEs are the main target of the EU’s Competitiveness and Innovation Programme (CIP) of 
the 2007-2013 MFF.14 The CIP supports innovation activities (including eco-innovation), 
provides better access to finance, and delivers business support services in the EU regions. 
As part of the CIP, the Entrepreneurship and Innovation Programme (EIP) has the objective 
of increasing access to finance for the start-up and growth of SMEs in the EU, through the 
means of two financial instruments: the high growth and innovative SME (GIF) and the SME 
guarantee facility (SMEG). This chapter does not address instruments for SMEs from the 
Cohesion Policy, which are mentioned in chapter 5.  
5.1 The high growth and innovative SME (GIF) 
The GIF is an equity investment financial instrument. GIF1 addresses early stage (seed and 
start-up) businesses by investing in specialised venture capital funds and other investment 
vehicles which in turn provide risk capital to innovative SMEs. GIF2 covers expansion stage 
investments by offering specialised risk capital funds which in turn provide quasi-equity or 
equity for innovative SMEs with high growth potential.  
The overall objective of the GIF is to improve access to finance for the start-up and growth 
phases of SMEs and for investment in innovation activities, thus overcoming the existing 
market gap. The budget allocation to the GIF amounts to €623 million. By the second half of 
2013, €438 million have leveraged €2.3 billion, which equals a leverage coefficient of 5. Under 
the same leverage, by the end of the GIF programme in 2015-2016, the total investment might 
                                                   
12 http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/  
13 http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/facts-figures-analysis/index_en.htm  
14 The text uses the present tense, because while new programmes start this year, many of the 2007-
2013 programmes will still be operating until 2016 under the n+2 and n+3 rules, and new programmes 
are in any case enhancing the existing programmes. 
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exceed €3.2 billion.15 The multiplier effect has not been estimated, but is much higher than 
the leverage factor.16 
5.2 The SME guarantee facility (SMEG) 
The SMEG Facility consists of four business lines:17 
1) Guarantees for debt financing via loans or leasing to reduce the difficulties that SMEs face 
in accessing finance; 
2) Guarantees for microcredit financing to encourage financial institutions to play a greater 
role in the provision of smaller loans;  
3) Guarantees for equity or quasi-equity investments in SMEs in the seed and/or start-up 
phase, as well as mezzanine financing; 
4) Guarantees to support securitisation of SME debt finance portfolios to mobilise additional 
debt financing for SMEs.18 
The overall objective of SMEG is to improve access to finance for the start-up and growth 
phases of SMEs, and for investment in innovation activities (including eco-innovation). It 
provides counter-guarantees (or, where appropriate, co-guarantees for guarantee schemes 
operating in eligible countries), as well as direct guarantees for any other appropriate 
financial intermediary. The budget for the 2007-2013 period amounts to €506 million. By the 
second half of 2013, €460 million leveraged €14.2 billion of loans to SMEs, (i.e. a factor of 30), 
and volumes continue to increase. By the end of the programme by 2015-2016 the lending 
level is expected to increase further, and could potentially exceed €15 billion if the same 
leverage factor is maintained.  
5.3  Added value and additionality of the EIP 
The interim evaluation of the CIP notes that FIs under the EIP cater for a range of financing 
needs for SMEs, at different stages of their development and for different levels of financing 
(small to large). They offer a mix of pro-cyclical (venture capital) and counter-cyclical 
(guarantees) instruments, which allows for responsiveness to changing market conditions. 
The flexible design of the FIs allows to adapt to local conditions, while a global budget (with 
the possibility to transfer resources easily between different instruments) facilitates 
absorption and the maximum utilisation of available funds. The evaluation concluded that 
the underlying intervention strategy of the FI remains valid and highlights the need for the 
EIP to place greater emphasis on risk-capital and hybrid instruments (as compared to purely 
                                                   
15 Presentation by DG REGIO, ‘EU Financial Instruments and European Structural and Investment 
Funds (ESIF), Open Days Seminar, 9 October 2013 
16 J. Núñez-Ferrer, A. Volkery, S. Withana and K. Medarova (2012), “The implications for the EU and 
national budgets of the use of innovative financial instruments for the financing of EU policies and 
objectives”, study for the European Parliament’s Committee on the Budget, Directorate General for 
Internal Policies, Strasbourg. 
17 Decision N° 1639/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 2006 
establishing a Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme (2007 to 2013) - OJ L 310/15, 
09.11.2006 
18 Presentation by DG REGIO, ‘EU Financial Instruments and European Structural and Investment 
Funds (ESIF), Open Days Seminar, 9 October 2013 
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debt-based instruments) to support the financing needs of innovative SMEs with high 
growth potential.19 
The GIF has proven its usefulness in terms of European added value, because it directly 
addresses the EU core objectives of innovation, growth and jobs. As concerns the SMEG, the 
results are more controversial. Similar national schemes for assisting SMEs exist in many 
member states, and although a certain level of deadweight is inevitable when providing 
assistance on the basis of portfolios, the Court of Auditors estimates that deadweight losses 
(an estimated 38%) are nevertheless too high.20 While the SMEG is important to develop SME 
programmes in countries where there is no such assistance, it is not clear whether it should 
operate where such instruments already exist.21 
Nevertheless, the impact on the EU economy is clear – the EIP FIs (SMEG and GIF) enhanced 
the access of SMEs to finance, and received very positive feedback from final beneficiaries.22 
Between 2007 and mid-2013, the EIP FIs - GIF and SMEG - have assisted more than 240 700.23  
The support of beneficiaries by SMEG through guarantees encourages other investors or 
financiers to come on board as a result of the sharing of financial risk. 42% of SMEG 
beneficiaries stated that receiving the guaranteed loan made it easier to obtain additional 
financing, thus indicating the considerable leveraging effects attributable to the investment 
made by the Facility.24 
5.4 Improvements in the 2014-2020 MFF 
The SME support assistance under the Competitiveness of Enterprises and Small and 
Medium-sized Enterprises (COSME) programme under the MFF 2014-2020 addresses the 
overlaps and ensures instrument coordination. COSME is a successor of the current 
Competitiveness and Innovation Programme (CIP) support for innovative start-ups and 
SMEs and will be coordinated with the Risk Sharing Instrument (RSI) programme for SMEs 
under the umbrella programme in Horizon 2020.  
The COSME programme will be running from 2014 to 2020 with a planned budget of €2.3 
billion. COSME aims at strengthening the competitiveness and sustainability of EU 
enterprises, at encouraging an entrepreneurial culture, and at promoting the creation and 
growth of SMEs. These objectives will be met by improving: 
 access to finance for SMEs, 
 access to markets, both inside the Union and internationally, 
 framework conditions for businesses, and 
 promotion of entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial culture. 
The European Commission expects 330 000 EU firms to benefit from this facility until 2020, 
with the objective to helping them to create or save hundreds of thousands of jobs, and 
                                                   
19 GHK, Technopolis (2009) Interim Evaluation of the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework 
Programme (2007 – 2013), Specific Contract No ENTR/A4/04/093/1/09/22 Implementing 
Framework Contract No ENTR/04/093-Lot 1 
20 European Court of Auditors (2012), Innovative Financial Instruments for SMEs co-financed by the 
European Regional Development Fund, Special report No 2, 2012 
21 Núñez Ferrer et al. (Ibid.) 
22 EC (2012) Entrepreneurship and Innovation Programme EIP Performance Report, January 2012 
23 Presentation by DG REGIO, ‘EU Financial Instruments and European Structural and Investment 
Funds (ESIF), Open Days Seminar, 9 October 2013 
24 CSES, EIM (Ibid.)  
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launch new business products, services or processes.25 If well targeted, the potential of the 
instrument is very high; the transfer of knowledge it provides in countries where financial 
institutions do not traditionally operate those loans for lack of capacity is invaluable.  
 
 
6. Impact and Potential of the EU Budget and its Financial Instruments 
for Cohesion  
The impact and rationale of the Cohesion Policy is highly controversial and results have been 
mixed. However, the potential of the policy is considerable. The benefits of increasing the 
economic performance of regions and countries lagging behind are important in three 
aspects, in addition to traditional equity and cohesion considerations:  
First, the economic development of lagging regions in the EU (if well designed) create new 
opportunities for all European businesses (within and outside the regions supported), i.e. 
through higher demand from the regions. Of course, some specific sectors in wealthier 
countries and regions may face competition from the regions supported by this policy, but 
this is not negative for the EU economy as a whole, and is not worse than competition from 
other non-EU trading partners. It is important to point out that in the case of Cohesion 
support to new member states, accession was not only an opening to positive opportunities: 
The impacts on Central and Eastern European Country industries also meant a harsh 
restructuring that led to the collapse of many firms and businesses on the face of stronger 
and more efficient EU competitors. Without the Cohesion Policy poorer member states could 
also put into question the internal market. 
Second, the Cohesion policy is increasingly becoming the main vehicle to ensure the 
achievement of central EU objectives in a number of domains, particularly in the area of 
energy, transport and environment.  
Third, the transfer of knowledge and practices promoted by the Cohesion Policy for the 
public and private sectors is of great importance. While in the past programming was 
lacking focus affecting results, the increasing requirements in the last decade to integrate EU 
objectives, earmark funding and now ensure coherence with the National Reform 
                                                   
25 European Commission press release: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-1135_en.htm 
Box 3. Contribution of SME support programmes 
European Value Added: The support is in line with the Europe 2020 Strategy, because it 
directly addresses the core EU objectives for innovation, employment and higher growth. The 
value added for businesses for each Euro invested is expected to exceed €13. This means a 
minimum added value of €650 billion and a minimum €1 trillion for Horizon 2020, but 
expected to be substantially higher. 
Leverage: Leverage is very high. With leverage coefficients of 5 and 30 for GIF and SMEG 
respectively, with one billion of the EU budget, total funding has reached €18 billion. This 
means that COSME and RSI in the 2014-2020 period have the potential to raise €40-50 billion. 
Additionality: The importance of SMEs for the European economy, and the lack of lending 
and investment sources are well documented. National support for SMEs is very low or 
inexistent in some member states, in particular for innovative enterprises. The EU 
programmes provide support that otherwise would not reach SMEs. 
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Programmes. The common planning and programming procedures are improved the quality 
of knowledge gathering and of economic strategy. This should improve considerably both 
performance and impact. 
It is clear that the Cohesion Policy is far more than a mere solidarity and financial transfer 
mechanism to poorer regions; it is a driving force for further changes in the member states’ 
economies to pursue EU objectives. There is evidence of it having positive long-term effects 
on the economies it has assisted (see chapter 2).  
What the crisis revealed is that national strategies require a focus on endogenous growth 
factors, namely the development of human capital and the necessary environment for 
innovation, and the generation of value added. Investing in infrastructure alone in a rapidly 
changing knowledge drive global economy is no longer a sufficient condition. The European 
Commission has been reinforcing the strategic focus of cohesion policies, with a particular 
emphasis already in the 2007-2013 MFF. In addition, the economic crisis has created a 
political momentum allowing for stronger conditionalities on strategic planning and 
targeting, in line with the Europe 2020 strategy, with a focus on what the Commission calls a 
‘competitive (constructed) advantage’.26  
Much of the Cohesion Policy focuses on infrastructures and social policy, mainly with grants 
co-financed by national governments. The leverage effect of most interventions is thus rather 
low, although the economic multiplier of well-targeted interventions can be very large, 
shifting up long-term growth as estimated by econometric models (see chapter 2). 
The total allocated budget of the Cohesion Policy in 2007-2013 amounted to €355 billion (in 
2011 prices) – i.e. 34% of the total EU budget for that period, from €45 to €48 billion a year. 
The rate of financing varies between regions, and while in convergence regions it is just 
under 1, it increases to 3 in competitiveness regions. The total leverage rate is around 1 to 1, 
with a total investment thus approaching €700 billion.27 What matters, however, is the 
resulting impact, or multiplier. The economic effect, or value added, was estimated to 
amount to four times the EU investment28 for the 2000-2006 MFF. If the impact were to be the 
same, this would result in a return of about €1.4 trillion, or €700 billion in net. This figure, as 
the model results in chapter 2 suggest have a large margin of error, but the impact is most 
likely considerable. 
6.1 The Role of the Financial instruments in Cohesion Policy 
According to Article 44 of the General Regulation,29 financial instruments under the 2007-
2013 Cohesion Policy take the following forms: 
1. Financial engineering instruments for enterprises, primarily SMEs, such as venture capital, 
guarantee funds and loan funds; 
                                                   
26 The word ‘constructed’ denotes new activities that can be developed from scratch, and not just the 
maintenance and promotion of existing structures and businesses, as long as the new activities are 
sustainable in the longer-term. 
27 European Commission Key statistics for the Cohesion Policy 
(http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/thefunds/funding/index_en.cfm) 
28 Figure derived from the Hermin model estimations for the MFF 2000-2006 and presented by 
Commissioner Lewandowski, see http://www.euractiv.com/euro-finance/lewandowski-euro-
invested-eu-lev-interview-514566 
29 COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1083/2006 of 11 July 2006 laying down general provisions on 
the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and 
repealing Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 
WHAT ARE THE EFFECTS OF THE EU BUDGET: DRIVING FORCE OR DROP IN THE OCEAN?  19 
 
2. Urban development funds, interested in PPP and other projects included in an integrated 
plan for sustainable urban development; and 
3. Funds and other forms of incentive schemes, providing loans, guarantees for repayable 
investment, or equivalent instruments, for energy efficiency and use of renewable energy 
in buildings, including in existing housing.30 
For the Programming Period 2007-2013, in cooperation with the EIB, the EIF, the Council of 
Europe Development Bank and other financial institutions, the European Commission 
developed several FIs31 for the Cohesion Policy, namely: 
1. Two initiatives were set up to promote the use of financial instruments: 
 JEREMIE (Joint European Resources for Micro to Medium Enterprises) – is an 
initiative that promotes the use of financial instruments to improve access to finance 
for SMEs via Structural Funds interventions. JEREMIE can support the creation of 
new business or the expansion of existing ones, and the access to investment capital. 
 JESSICA (Joint European Support for Sustainable Investment in City Areas) – is an 
initiative that supports sustainable urban development and regeneration through 
financial engineering mechanisms.  
2. Two technical assistance facilities were also launched: 
 JASPERS (Joint Assistance to Support Projects in European Regions) – is a technical 
assistance facility for the twelve EU countries who joined the EU in 2004 and 2007. It 
provides the Member States concerned with the support they need to prepare high 
quality major projects, which will be co-financed by EU funds.  
 JASMINE (Joint Action to Support Microfinance Institutions) - provides both 
technical assistance and financial support to non-bank micro-credit providers/micro-
finance institutions and helps them to improve the quality of their operations. 
During the 2007–2013 programming period, member states and managing authorities (MAs) 
are permitted to use some European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and European 
Social Fund (ESF) resources to support FIs. By the end of 2010, around 5% of the ERDF 
allocations in the current programming period, and around 0.7% of declared ESF eligible 
expenditures were allocated to FIs. Contributions of EU Structural Funds used for FIs are 
capped, so the risk is limited to the amount allocated to the different instruments. 
The leverage of each FI depends on the type of instrument, its sector and contextual 
conditions. Based on information to date, the following leverage effects have been estimated 
by the Commission: 
 For equity-based instruments, it is estimated that €1 of public support led to equity 
investment into enterprises between €1 and €3.4. 
 For guarantee-based instruments, the estimated leverage amounts to between €1 and €7.5. 
 For loan-based instruments, the estimated leverage effect amounts to between €1 and €2.32  
                                                   
30 European Commission (2012), Revised guidance note on financial engineering instruments, under 
article 44 of Council regulation (EC) No1083/2006. 8.2.2012, Brussels. 
31 http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/thefunds/instruments/index_en.cfm 
32 European Commission (2012), Financial instruments in Cohesion Policy, Commission Staff Working 
Document, SWD(2012)36, 27.2.2012, Brussels. 
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Further to this, FIs under Cohesion Policy has led to other important benefits beyond the 
leverage effect, which are relevant in terms of understanding the broader impact of FIs. For 
example, the revolving nature of FIs still allows for EU public resources to be reinvested in 
the same projects, which is not possible with grants. Also, FIs are subject to more stringent 
rules on fiscal discipline, which has arguably provided an incentive for better quality 
projects. 
6.2 Next Programming Period 2014-2020  
In the next programming period 2014-2020 the use of financial instruments within the 
Cohesion policy is expanded and strengthened. The potential impact on the economies of the 
EU is considerable, so in the light of the current economic situation and the increasing 
scarcity of public resources, financial instruments are expected to play an even more 
important role in pursuing the objectives of the cohesion policy in the 2014-2020 
programming period.  
The Commission’s proposal provides greater flexibility for Member States and managing 
authorities when designing programmes, both to choose between delivering investments 
through grants and financial instruments, and to select the most suitable financial 
instrument. It also gives more clarity and certainty in the legal framework for financial 
instruments. 
From a budgetary perspective, the strengthening of financial instruments, as catalysts of 
public and private resources, will help member states and regions to achieve the strategic 
investment levels needed to implement the Europe 2020 Strategy. 
 
 
 
7. Impact and Potential of the EU Budget and its Financial Instruments 
for Trans-European Networks  
The Commission estimates that during the period 2014-2020 about €200 billion are needed in 
order to complete the trans-European energy networks, while €500 billion should be invested 
in the trans-European transport network, and between €181 and €273 billion are needed in 
the ICT sector. The EU provides support to the trans-European networks (TEN) mainly in 
Box 4. Contribution of the Cohesion Policy and the FIs 
European Value Added: The Cohesion policy’s value added is in a number of areas beyond 
GDP growth in the targeted regions. The knowledge transfer, streamlining of strategic 
planning tools, etc. all have an important role in Europe’s economic integration. On the 
economic value added, this is estimated to be in net double the EU contribution of the budget 
or equal to the total investment in 2013-2020. 
Leverage: Given the dominance of grants, the total investment generated through the 
Cohesion policy is estimated to be approximately €700 billion, €1 of the budget co-financed by 
approximately €1. With the expansion of FIs in the future this should increase. 
Additionality: The Cohesion policy has to follow EU additionality rules. For poorer member 
states and regions additionality is not a central problem. With the new programming 
requirements and targeting this concern is becoming less of a risk. 
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the form of grants. Through the programme trans-European transport network TEN-T, the 
EU budget allocates financial aid / grants to projects of common interest.  
The total budget allocated to TEN-T for the programming period 2007-2013 was €8.013 
billion.33 This figure was only 2% of the total estimated required expenditure for the TEN-T 
in this period. It was expected to be complemented by the means of projects under the 
Cohesion Fund and ERDF (€44 billion), in addition to €53 billion in EIB loans and 
guarantees. It was estimated that member states (or other investors would have to finance 
€285 billion to cover the remaining gap (63% of the total).34 The figures do not mention 
additional private funding. 
However, as the Impact Assessment accompanying the Connecting Europe Facility 
concluded, the financial leverage of the programme was poor.35 For the first €7 billion of 
funding released by the budget under the TEN-T, the co-financing reached only €42 billion, 
which implies a leverage rate of around 6, which is far below the actual needs. Given the 
credit crunch, national investments and private funding have been low.  
The programme for TEN-E was very limited, with a budget of only €155 million, as energy 
was not considered to be an EU competence until recently, and the network was left to 
operators to develop. Only with rising climate and energy security concerns did this area 
take a more important position, which is reflected in the new Connecting Europe facility. For 
ICT the investments needed were generally expected to be coming from the private sector. 
7.1 Loan Guarantee Instrument for Trans-European Transport Network 
Projects 
The LGTT is a financial instrument provided under the TEN-T programme since 2008. It is 
an EIB loan guarantee, which, if used, would become junior debt. The LGTT guarantee is 
provided in favour of commercial banks that provide a stand-by credit facility (SBF) to a 
project and will normally not exceed 10% of total senior debt (although it can be up to 20% in 
exceptional circumstances). It offers a maximum amount of LGTT guarantees of €200 million 
per project.36  
The aim of this FI is to facilitate private sector involvement in financing TEN-T infrastructure, 
although the focus is on bank lending. The LGTT covers some of the risks associated with such 
projects, by improving the ability of a borrower to meet senior debt servicing obligations in the 
critical first five to seven years of operation to make up for any revenue shortfalls (i.e. where 
traffic levels are lower than anticipated). The target group are project promoters, who could 
be either Member State authorities or private companies (supported by Member States). 
The budget of the LGTT is €1 billion, divided in - €500 million each from the Commission and 
the EIB.37 The LGTT is intended to support up to €20 billion of senior loans. Thus the leverage 
reaches a coefficient of 40 (i.e. €1 provided by the EU budget is expected to bring €40 in the EU 
                                                   
33 Article 18(1) of Regulation (EC) 680/2007 
34 http://ec.europa.eu/transport/infrastructure/ten-t-funding-and-financing/doc/funding_figs.pdf.  
35 SDG (2011) 2011 ‘Commission staff working document accompanying the Regulation establishing 
the Connecting Europe Facility - Impact Assessment COM (2011) 665 
36 EIB and the European Commission (2008) “The Loan Guarantee Instrument for Trans-European 
Transport Network Projects – Fact-Sheet” 
37 Article 6(1)(d) of Regulation (EC) No 680/2007 laying down general rules for the granting of 
Community financial aid in the field of the trans-European transport and energy networks; also EIB 
and the European Commission (2008) 
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economy). Thus, it was expected that over a decade the instrument could mobilise loans to a 
level of €50 billion. By early 2012, seven contracts had been signed for an amount of €400 
million with LGTT Facilities underpinning some €12 billion of capital investment. 
The LGTT was also designed to ease bank funding for infrastructure projects, but since all 
major markets have been affected by the strong contraction of available bank funding, in its 
current form the LGTT is not able to increase the available funding base provided by 
commercial banks. To address this issue, the EIB and the Commission have developed 
instruments that allow for new funding models based on institutional investors’ capital 
resources. This accounts for the introduction of the Project Bonds Initiative (PBI). However, 
despite the PBI, the LGTT will not be abolished. It will instead be reformed for the new 
programming period 2014-2020, so as to be able to offer more flexibility and continue to 
support the remaining bank funding. 
7.2 Project Bond Initiative 
The Project Bond Initiative is a joint initiative by the European Commission and the EIB. It is 
designed to diversify the sources of financing for large-scale infrastructure projects in the 
sectors of transport (TEN-T), energy (TEN-E), and information and communication 
technology (ICT). Thus, the Project Bond Initiative would be a reliable substitute for the 
decrease in financing from traditional financiers due to the financial crisis. The Project Bonds 
are intended to attract funding through capital market financing from more conservative 
long-term institutional investors, such as pension funds. 
In this straightforward mechanism, the EU budget will share the risk with the EIB in 
delivering a first-loss debt guarantee of up to 20% of the project’s senior debt (EIB Sub-debt 
in Figure 5). This combined risk guarantee should improve projects’ bankability and attract 
debt-capital market financing. The instrument can take the form of “a debt instrument or a 
contingent (guarantee) facility or both” so that a project bond can be issued. This effectively 
means that the EIB will create a standby loan facility, which can be drawn upon if the project 
ever suffers from financial problems, and/or supply subordinated debt at the start of the 
project. If the facility is used, it becomes subordinated debt.38 
A pilot phase was launched for 2013-2015 to test the Instrument. This testing phase is funded 
by €230 million of EU budgetary resources from unused budget lines from the multi-annual 
financial framework 2007-2013 programmes (€200 million from TEN-T/LGTT, €10 million 
from the TEN-E budget and €20 million from ICT budget). This should enable the EIB to 
provide financing to infrastructure projects worth more than €4 billion across the three 
sectors. The EIB Board of Directors has already approved nine projects in six different 
Member States.39 Based on experience with the LGTT, the Commission estimates a high 
leverage effect of between 15 and 20. It also notes that the effect will vary according to the 
details of the project.40 
Starting with the financial framework 2014-2020, the Project Bonds Initiative will be rooted 
within the Connecting European Facility (CEF). 
                                                   
38 Article 1a of Regulation (EC) No 680/2007 laying down general rules for the granting of 
Community financial aid in the field of the trans-European transport and energy networks, as 
amended by Regulation (EU) No 670/2012; H. van Essen, L. Brinke, R. Bain, N. Smith and I. Skinner 
(2012) Financing instruments for the EU’s transport infrastructure Report IP/B/TRAN/FWC/2010-
006/LOT4/C2/SC1 for the European Parliament’s Transport and Tourism Committee. 
39 See the EIB web page - The Europe 2020 Project Bond Initiative - Innovative infrastructure financing. 
40 SEC (2011) 1237; van Essen et al. (2012). 
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Figure 5. Subordinated Project Bonds Instruments 
 
Source: EIB (2011) ‘Supporting the EU budget: the EIB contribution’, presentation at the CEPS Task 
Force meeting, power point presentation, version of 22 June 2011. 
7.3 Conclusion for TEN programme and CEF 
The European Commission has estimated that the level of investment that needs to be raised 
in order to complete the core trans-European networks amounts to €1.8 trillion.41 In the new 
2014-2020 MFF the EU budget will support the further development of the trans-European 
networks under the new Connecting Europe Facility (CEF). CEF is aimed at supporting the 
development of high-performing, sustainable and efficiently interconnected trans-European 
networks in the field of energy, telecommunications and transport. The CEF has an overall 
budget of €33.242 billion42 to invest in those fields. €26 billion for transport, €5.8 billion for 
energy and €1.1 for telecommunications. It is expected that €1 million spent at European 
level will generate €5 million from Member State governments and €20 million from the 
private sector.43 This is most likely an excessive expectation, but with a reinforced FI use and 
a better strategy considerable leverage should be achieved. 
The size of this leverage will partially depend on the amount of funds dedicated to the LGTT 
and PBI FIs. The CEF regulation limits the use of funds for financial instruments to 10% of 
the total budget (a questionable limitation), if this was done and €3.3 billion were dedicated 
to FIs (PBI and LGTT) it could have a cumulative leverage impact on transport infrastructure 
between €46 and €70 billion.44  
CEF investments will have a significant economic impact through its focus on increasing 
accessibility and improving the efficiency of network industries. Transport costs, for 
example, amount to between 2% and 10% of businesses’ total costs, while households in the 
                                                   
41 “Financing Europe 2020: A consolidated view - Interim report for the Committee of the Regions”, 
Raphael Sauter (IEEP), Andrea Illes (IEEP), Jorge Nunez (CEPS) 2014 (forthcoming publication). 
42 In current prices, Regulation No 1316/2013 of 11 December 2013 establishing the CEF 
43 http://ec.europa.eu/transport/infrastructure/tentec/tentec-
portal/site/en/connectingeurope.html  
44 EC (2011e) Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council establishing the 
Connecting Europe Facility, (COM(2011)665, 19.10.2011, Brussels 
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EU spend about 13% of their income on transport-related goods and services. Improved 
infrastructure connections will contribute to reducing these costs, with a significant effect on 
competitiveness and wealth. Improved energy transmission infrastructure by 2020 will 
translate into at least 0.42% of GDP increase in the EU. For transport, an impact analysis 
estimated a socio-economic benefit worth 1.6 times the investment size.45 The deployment of 
eProcurement, an EU-wide digital service, could lead to an estimated minimum of €50 billion 
in savings.46  
 
 
8. Special Initiatives in the Area of Energy 
This chapter presents some financial instruments which were modest in size in the MFF 
2007-2013, but which have a large potential and will (under different names an forms) be 
replicated in the future.  
8.1 Intelligent Energy Europe Programme (IEE) 
The IEE Programme promotes the use of sustainable energy and runs under the CIP in the 
form of grants (through call for proposals), procurement (through call for tenders) and 
project development services. The total budget allocated for implementation of the IEE II 
Programme for the period 2007-2013 is €730 million. According to the IEE’s performance 
report the programme forms the link from R&D to mass deployment, by means of activities 
aimed at accelerating the market uptake of energy innovations.47 It is estimated that the 
leverage of IEE is 15.48 
                                                   
45 ECORYS (2007), ‘Ex ante evaluation of the TEN-T Multi Annual Programme 2007-2013’, Report for 
the European Commission. 
46 Connecting Europe Facility – Investing in Europe’s growth” – brochure of European Commission, 
2013 
47 IEE (2012): Intelligent Energy Europe II: performance report (2007-2011), 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/intelligent/files/doc/reports/iee-ii-performance-report-2007-2011-
final_en.pdf  
48 https://www.ffg.at/sites/default/files/09_iee_18dec2013.pdf  
Box 5. Contribution of the TEN and the FIs 
European Value Added: The TENs have high European value added as they are strongly 
linked to the main pillar of the European Union for a Single Market, and the development of a 
well-integrated EU Internal Market with interconnection and interoperability of national 
networks. The economic impacts due to the CEF are expected to be high 0.2% of GDP in 
energy for example. For transport for each € spent the socio-economic return has been 
estimated at €1.6. In addition, significant savings for the business and citizens from 
eProcurement are expected.  
Leverage: The leverage of the present TEN policy has been a factor of approximately five, 
raising by 2012 €44 billion with €7 billion investment. The CEF should increase the leverage to 
25 or 825 billion. This is a very high objective, but even much lower leverage factor would 
contribute considerable funds. 
Additionality: The additionality principle is preserved as the networks development is 
focused on priority projects that encompass more than one Member State, for which resources 
would unlikely be deployed at the sole national level. 
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A particularly interesting programme under IEE is the European Local Energy Assistance 
(ELENA), which provides technical assistance to municipalities and public entities. Thus, EU 
cities and regions receive help to implement viable investment projects in the areas of energy 
efficiency, renewable energy and sustainable urban transport. The assistance originates from 
the IEE Programme, and as of July 2012 €49 million were committed. ELENA covers up to 
90% of the technical support costs needed to prepare, implement and finance the investment 
programme. The expected leverage for the ELENA programmes is more than 20. 
8.2 The European Energy Efficiency Fund (EEEF) 
The EEE-F is a structured finance vehicle in the form of public-private partnership. It was 
launched in 2011 as part of the EC’s European Energy Programme for Recovery, in support 
for both project development and investments in the following areas:  
 Energy saving and energy efficiency investments 
 Small and medium-scale renewable energy projects 
 Clean urban transport 
The fund provides senior and junior loans, guarantees or equity participation from 
institutional investors, professional investors and other investors. Targeted investors are 
donor agencies, governments, international financial institutions, and professional private 
investors. The initial fund volume is €265 million, offered by the European Union (€125 
million), the EIB (€75 million), Cassa dei Depositi e Prestiti (€60 million), and Deutsche Bank 
(€5 million). 
The EEE-F fund is operationally managed by Deutsche Bank and the resources will have to 
be allocated by end of March 2014. The leverage factor expected by the European 
Commission is expected to be of at least 20 (of the entire fund, for the EU budget 
contribution alone that would be 40). The fund is revolving and is not time limited, thus, in 
time leverage will multiply.49 
8.3 The Marguerite Fund 
As part of the European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP) the EC launched the 2020 
European Fund for Energy, Climate Change and Infrastructure, or the Marguerite Fund. It 
provides funding for capital-intensive infrastructure projects of public interest and bridges a 
funding gap for such projects. The initiatives pursue the implementation of strategically 
important European policy objectives in the Energy/Climate, Renewable and Transport 
sector infrastructures, and apply a market-based principle of return to investors.50 
Six major European financial institutions51 have committed €710 million (€100 million from 
each) to the Marguerite Fund, and an incremental €110 million is provided by three further 
investors, including the European Commission which contributes €80 million out of the TEN-
T budget. Marguerite targets fund size of €1.5 billion in total commitments for projects with 
attractive long-term and stable risk-adjusted returns. Thus, it is expected to leverage 18 to 19 
times the contribution of the EU budget. 
 
                                                   
49 http://ec.europa.eu/energy/intelligent/getting-funds/project-development-
assistance/index_en.htm  
50 http://www.eib.org/products/equity_funds/infrastructure_equity_funds/marguerite_fund.htm  
51 Caisse des dépôts et consignations, France; Cassa Depositi e Prestiti, Italy; European Investment 
Bank; Instituto de Crédito Oficial, Spain; KfW, Germany; and PKO Bank Polski SA, Poland. 
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9. The EU Budget and External Action 
This chapter addresses the financial instruments that are being developed in the area of 
external action, because of the valuable contribution they offer to extend the reach of EU’s 
development aid. These instruments - often referred to as ‘blending instruments’ - have a 
governance structure that promotes an increased policy coherence and coordination of the 
different development actors, i.e. international financial institutions, national development 
agencies, member states and local actors.  
An important avenue to increase the level of EU support to developing countries is to 
complement development aid grants with blending instruments, i.e. development loans 
under generous conditions thanks to specific grant elements. Blending instruments should 
not be used to substitute grants support, but to achieve a better distribution of assistance, by 
discriminating projects requiring pure grants from those that can be at least partially self-
financing.  
The EU blending instruments are still young, with the first launched in 2007 for Sub-Saharan 
Africa, the Infrastructure Trust Fund (ITF). Since then, the number of blending facilities has 
multiplied, bringing together European development financial institutions, and pooling 
development grant funding from member states in common funds. The different instruments 
are listed in Table 1. 
Table 1. Brief overview of EU blending facilities 
Name of facility 
Region covered 
Launch 
date 
Allocation of funds  Participating financiers  
ITF: Infrastructure Trust 
Fund for Africa 
47 African Countries52 
2007 Grant funds allocated:  
€308,7m from 10th EDF + 
€64m from MS budgets ( as 
of 31 Dec. 2010) 
AFD, AfDB, BIO, 
COFIDES, EIB, FINNFUND, 
KfW, Lux-Development, MoF 
Greece, OEeB, SIMEST, 
SOFID, PIDG 
                                                   
52 Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Congo Brazzaville, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Gabon, Equatorial 
Guinea, São Tomé & Principe, Ghana, Togo, Guinea-Bissau, Republic of Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, 
Kenya, Somalia, Lesotho, Swaziland, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Comoros, 
Seychelles, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Cape Verde, Gambia, Sierra 
Leone, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
Box 6. Contribution of the Special Energy Initiatives and the FIs 
European Value Added: These instruments promote the best projects across Europe and help 
knowledge transfer. The contribution to innovation and technology deployment are 
significant. 
Leverage: These are very high leverage projects, in the sense that they promote the 
development of new financial models, developing new sustainable finance models for energy 
systems of the future. 
Additionality: These projects are aiming at providing the technical and administrative 
capacity building necessary for projects. Additionality is very high and of no concern. 
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NIF: Neighbourhood 
Investment Facility  
Countries eligible for 
ENPI53 
2008 €700m for 2007-2013 from 
EU budget + €64.4m from 
MS budgets (as of 31 Dec. 
2011) 
AECID, AFD, CEB, EBRD, 
EIB, KfW, NIB, OeEB, 
SIMEST, SOFID 
WBIF: Western Balkan 
Investment Framework 
Western Balkans54 
2009 €166m from EU budget + 
€10m EIB, €10m EBRD, 
€10m CEDB + €47.6 m in 
grants from MS budgets (+ 
Norway) (as of 31 Dec. 
2011) 
CEB, EBRD, EIB, World bank 
Group, KfW, MFB, CMZR, 
OeEB, SID 
LAIF: Latin America 
Investment Facility 
Latin American 
Countries55 
2010 €125m 2010-2013 from EU 
budget 
AFD, BCIE, IDB, CAF, EIB, 
KfW, NIB, OeEB 
IFCA: Investment 
facility for Central Asia 
Central Asian countries56 
2010 €20m 2010 from the EU 
budget 
NIF accredited institutions 
can participate. 
Asia Investment Facility 
Asian Countries57 
2011 €30 m from the EU budget EIB, EBRD, NIB, ADB, AfD, 
KfW, OeEB, SIMEST, SOFID 
Caribbean Investment 
Facility 
ACP Caribbean 
countries58 
2012 €40 m 10th EDF EIB, NIB, CDB, IDB, others 
joining 
Investment Facility for 
the Pacific 
ACP-Pacific countries59 
2012 €10 m EIB, AFD, KfW, AusAID, 
ADB, NZAID, WB 
Source: J. Núñez-Ferrer, A. Volkery, S. Withana and K. Medarova (2012), “The implications for the EU 
and national budgets of the use of innovative financial instruments for the financing of EU policies 
and objectives”, study for the European Parliament’s Committee on the Budget, Directorate General 
for Internal Policies, Strasbourg. 
The size of the EU blending facilities has been small so far, even if the leverage60 achieved 
has been considerable (Figure 6). The EU budget grant of €1.3 billion has leveraged €41 
                                                   
53 European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument countries: Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Russia and Ukraine, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, 
Morocco, Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Syria and Tunisia. 
54 Albania, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro and FYROM, Serbia. 
55 Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, México, Nicaragua, Panamá, Perú, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
56 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. 
57 Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, Chine, DPR Korea India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Vietnam. 
58 Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, 
Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts & Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint-Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname and 
Trinidad & Tobago. 
59 Cook Islands, East Timor, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua 
New-Guinea, Samoa, Salomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu 
60 The leverage is to the total value of the support divided by grant offered.  
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billion in developing funding by 2012, i.e. a factor of 31. The amount allocated to the 
blending facilities is going to increase in the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF).  
Figure 6. Grant, Financiers’ Loans and Other Funding in the EU blending facilities, € million 
 
Source: 2012 blending facility reports by the European Commission. 
The blending facilities also offer the opportunity to use a number of grant assistance forms, 
which allow to tailor the support to the needs of the recipient country, the risk level faced by 
the financiers, and the stage of economic development of the country, i.e. the capacity to 
service the loans. This flexibility delivers better quality projects in terms of selection and 
economic results, as well as reduction in the levels of market distortion.  
10. Making the EU Budget Become a Strong Driving Force 
This short report has presented a list of factors that make the EU budget a driving force for 
the EU from both the economic and the political points of view, despite its modest size in 
terms of GDP. It is nevertheless quite substantial for its share of EU direct investments in 
infrastructure. It is futile to attempt to deny that not all is as it should. The use of the funds 
has been often suboptimal and, as a result, has undermined the policies it finances. This, 
however, is being addressed by the ever-growing strategic requirements on planning and 
targeting. While over-prescription should be avoided, regions and member states have to be 
motivated to focus on key areas of long-term economic development rather than on short-
term gains. The EU budget should be treated as an investment tool and not as a vehicle to 
achieve short-term objectives.  
The EU budget has a key role to play in European integration. First, it promotes the 
development of the underpinning infrastructures that are required for a functioning single 
market. It provides assistance to develop the endogenous growth potential in European 
regions using innovative methods, promoting also the exchange of best practice. The 
influence of the EU budget on European integration is also most likely underestimated. 
From a financial point of view, the size is deceptive, as it additionally leverages a 
considerable amount of funding for projects in line with EU objectives. It is also worth noting 
that the EU does not cover all functions of government and does not finance operational 
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costs, but is mainly a capital investment. As such, the support it offers is often substantial in 
the specific operations it covers. While very important, leverage is of course not the objective: 
impact is the actual core of the matter. Leverage is important as a measure of the amount of 
funding that EU objectives manage to attract.  
Concrete impacts of financial instruments can only be determined in detail in a few cases, 
such as for SMEs, as most financial instruments are relatively new, and the realisation of 
many of the projects is mostly still in the future. Table 2 summarises the leverage and some 
impacts of the measures listed above. As the results show, the EU’s leverage in the areas 
presented is equivalent the size of the whole budget of the EU budget, excluding co-
financing of rural development and some minor financial instruments. The net economic 
benefit could be reaching 1.5-2 times the whole EU budget or 1.5%-2% of GDP. For Horizon 
2020, the leverage could be higher than 1, this means a total investment of over twice the EU 
budget or 2% GDP. The net economic benefit could reach 2.5%-3% of GDP. These figures are 
just illustrating the potential based on a sum of results of evaluations.  
Table 2. The financial leverage and impact of the EU budget 
Policy area  Leverage and impact  
2007-2013 
Potential leverage and impact 
2014-2020 
Research and 
Innovation 
The leverage of grants is low. 
Leverage of FIs: €14 billion. 
Business added value: €650 billion. 
The leverage of grants will increase. 
Leverage of FI: > €50 billion.  
Business added value: > €900 billion, 
probably much larger. 
Support to SMEs 
(Competitiveness 
Policy) 
The FIs developed to support 
SMEs have leveraged over €18 
billion with less than €1 billion. 
The impacts are high economically 
and in employment terms.  
The budget will more than double to 
€2.3 billion, with a more effective 
policy. The leverage should exceed €40 
billion. 
Cohesion Leverage, €1 to 1€, total 
investment €700 billion. Total 
economic impact €1.4 trillion, net 
€700 billion. 
Leverage likely slightly higher. The 
economic impact should increase due 
to better strategy, in particular long 
term. 
Trans European 
Networks 
The leverage factor of the policy 
has been estimated to be 6, should 
reach approximately €50 billion. 
Impact was limited in relation to 
needs due to limited resources.  
With the new policy structure 
Commission expects a leverage factor 
of 25 (private and public) for the next 
MFF, which would represent €825 
billion. Some of the leverage would be 
generated from the FIs. Economic 
impact approximately 1.6 times or €1.3 
billion. 
Special initiative in the 
Area of energy 
The EU budget’s contribution of €1 
billion is helping to leverage 
approximately €15 billion 
The programmes will continue. 
External action 
blending facilities 
€1,3 billion have contributed to 
leverage €41 billion 
The facilities will expand considerably 
in the next MFF. 
 
Contrary to what its size may convey, the EU budget is not a drop in the ocean; it is truly an 
important force in the EU. Looking at past performance, the EU budget has been largely a 
facilitator of integration in the EU. For the future, however, the budget can become a more 
powerful driving force in the areas it supports. How far it will go will largely depend on the 
quality of planning and implementation by national authorities. 
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Annex: Innovative Financial Instruments in the 2007-2013 period 
Funds under centralised or joint management 
Acronym 
Full name 
Budget 
(€ million)  
Type of EU 
support 
Total investment 
at beneficiary 
level (€ million)  
Objectives Geographic 
coverage 
Entrusted 
 entity 
CIP GIF 
High growth 
and 
innovative 
SME facility 
Budget 
allocation 2007-
2013: 623  
Actual Budget: 
(2007-2011) 408  
Equity 
investment 
through 
Venture 
Capital 
Funds 
1.900 i) Contribute to the establishment and financing of 
SMEs and the reduction of the equity and risk 
capital market gap, which prevents SMEs from 
exploiting their growth potential, with a view to 
improving the European venture capital market; 
and  
 
ii) support innovative SMEs with high growth 
potential, in particular those undertaking research, 
development and other innovation. 
EU27+ 
European 
Economic Area 
+Turkey, 
Croatia, 
Montenegro, 
FYROM, Serbia 
EIF 
CIP SMEG07 
SME 
guarantee 
facility 
Budget 
allocation 2007-
2013: 506  
 
Actual budget: 
393  (2007-2011) 
Loan 
guarantee, 
microcredit 
guarantee, 
equity and 
mezzanine 
guarantee, 
securitisatio
n guarantee 
9.400 (a) debt financing via loans or leasing, to reduce the 
difficulties SMEs face in accessing finance  and to 
stimulate job-creation through increased availability 
of debt financing, through the provision  of Loan 
Guarantees,  
 
(b) micro-credit financing, to encourage Lenders to 
play a greater role in the provision of loans of a 
smaller amount, through the provision of Micro-
Credit Guarantees and optionally grants to 
Intermediaries to partially offset the high 
administrative cost of micro-credit financing, 
 
(c)  guarantees for equity or quasi-equity 
EU27+ 
European 
Economic Area 
+Turkey, 
Croatia, 
Montenegro, 
(FYRo)Macedo
nia, Serbia 
EIF 
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investments in SMEs, to provide seed capital and/or 
capital in the start-up phase as well as mezzanine 
financing through the provision of Equity 
Guarantees, 
 
(d) securitisations, to support the creation of SME 
debt finance portfolios, by mobilising additional 
debt financing for SMEs 
RSFF 
Risk Sharing 
Finance 
Facility 
1000 risk sharing 4.800 Improve access to finance for research projects EU27 + 
European 
Economic Area 
+ Western 
Balkans 
EIB 
LGTT 
Loan 
Guarantee 
Instrument for 
Trans-
European 
Transport 
Network 
Projects 
500  
(200 of the 
LGTT budget 
to be utilised in 
the pilot phase 
of the project 
bond initiative) 
risk-sharing 12.000 Facilitate greater private sector involvement in the 
financing TEN-transport infrastructure. It mitigates 
post-construction revenue risk during the early 
operational phase and encourages demand risk 
based 
Private Public Partnership schemes. 
EU27 EIB 
Marguerite 
Fund 
The 2020 
European 
Fund for 
Energy, 
Climate 
Change and 
Infrastructure  
up to 80 equity  
EU made 
direct 
equity 
participatio
n in 
Marguerite 
Fund 
current size of 
fund 
780 
target size 1,500 
Contribute to infrastructure projects in key policy 
areas (TEN-T, TEN-E, renewables) through equity 
investment in Special Purpose Vehicles 
EU27 none 
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EPMF 
European 
Progress 
Microfinance 
Facility  
100 Microcredit 
guarantee, 
 
EU made 
direct 
equity 
participatio
n in 
Progress 
Microfinanc
e fund 
which is 
providing 
equity to 
Microfinanc
e 
Institutions 
current size of 
fund 178 
target size of fund 
225 
Increase access and availability of microfinance for 
disadvantaged groups and people at risk who want 
to establish micro-enterprises or for existing micro-
enterprises 
EU-27 EIF and EIB 
TTP 
Technology 
Transfer Pilot 
Project 
2 Equity or 
quasi-equity 
investment 
  Facilitate the transfer of knowledge from 
universities and research bodies into the 
marketplace, in particular into SMEs. Invest in and 
support technology transfer operations between 
universities and research institutions and 
enterprises, in particular SMEs, such as the creation 
of ‘spin-offs’ and/or the implementation of licensing 
or collaboration agreements. 
EU27 EIF 
JASMINE 
Joint action to 
support 
microfinance 
institutions in 
Europe 
5 Technical 
Assistance / 
Capacity 
building 
n.a. Promote a favourable legal and institutional 
and environment for micro micro-credit in 
European regions 
To help non non-bank financial intermediaries who 
want to act on the microcredit scene reach a high 
standard in terms of governance and lending 
practices 
Regions of 
EU27 
EIF 
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ELENA 
European 
Local ENergy 
Assistance 
97 TA / Project 
Developme
nt Service 
(PDS) 
1.600 Develop investment programmes that can then be 
replicated in other cities and regions; accelerating 
the introduction of energy efficiency and renewable 
energy sources, notably through innovative 
financial techniques and practices, often at an early 
stage of market penetration. 
MS, 
(FYRo)Macedo
nia and EEA 
members 
(Iceland, 
Lichtenstein, 
Norway) 
EIB, KFW, 
CEB, EBRD 
(soon) 
EEEF 
European 
Energy 
Efficiency 
Fund 
 146,3 EU direct 
equity 
participation 
technical 
assistance 
and 
awareness 
raising from 
the TA 
facility 
current size of 
fund 265 
target size of fund 
600  
Support energy efficiency and greenhouse gas 
reduction through promotion of energy efficiency 
and small scale renewable energy investment in a 
municipal context 
EU27 EIB 
Funds under shared management 
Acronym 
Full name 
Budget  
 (€ million)  
Type of EU 
support 
Total investment 
at beneficiary 
level (€ million)  
Objectives Geographic 
coverage 
Entrusted 
 entity 
JEREMIE 
Joint 
European 
Resources for 
Micro to 
Medium 
Enterprises 
around 700 equity, 
loans and 
guarantees 
n.a. Help managing authorities to design and implement 
programmes facilitating SMEs access to finance. 
Facilitate the use of financial engineering products 
such as Venture Capital, guarantees, etc. 
regions of 
EU27 
EIF 
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JESSICA 
Joint 
European 
Support for 
Sustainable 
Investment in 
City Areas 
around 63 loans/equit
y provided 
by Urban 
Developme
nt Funds to 
PPP 
structures 
or other 
n.a. Help the authorities in the Member States of the 
European Union establishing financial engineering 
mechanisms to support investment in sustainable 
urban development and energy efficiency.  
regions of 
EU27 
EIB, CEB 
JASPERS 
Joint 
Assistance to 
Support 
Projects in 
European 
Regions 
35 million in 
2010 
TA / Project 
Developme
nt Service 
(PDS) 
n.a. Assist the 12 Central and Eastern EU Member States 
and Croatia in the preparation of major projects to 
be submitted for grant financing under the 
Structural and Cohesion Funds. 
EU 12 and 
Croatia 
EIB, EBRD, 
KfW 
External instruments 
Acronym Full  
name 
Budget in  
(€ million)  
Type of EU 
support 
Total investment 
at beneficiary 
level (€ million)  
Objectives Geographic 
coverage 
Entrusted 
 entity 
FEMIP 
Facility for 
Euro-
Mediterranean 
Investment 
and 
Partnership  
128 (risk 
capital)  
+ 105 (technical 
assistance)  
+ 1 (FEMIP 
Trust Fund) 
equity, 
Technical 
Assistance, 
contribution
s to FEMIP 
trust fund 
  Economic development and the integration of the 
Mediterranean partner countries; two priority areas: 
support for the private sector and creating an 
investment-friendly environment 
Algeria, Egypt, 
Gaza/ 
Westbank, 
Israel, Jordan, 
Lebanon, 
Morocco, Syria, 
Tunisia 
EIB 
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WBIF 
Western 
Balkans 
Investment 
Framework  
87 until now Technical 
Assistance 
or co-
financing  
  Support investments in priority infrastructure, 
private sector (incl. SMEs) and energy efficiency 
projects to be financed by grants from COM, IFIs, 
MS and other donors and loans provided by IFIs 
candidate and 
potential 
candidate 
countries 
EIB, EBRD, 
CEB, MS 
through their 
public 
financial 
institutions 
NIF 
Neighbour-
hood 
Investment 
Facility 
700 Technical 
Assistance, 
interest rate 
subsidies, 
risk capital 
  Cover the investment needs of the EU neighbouring 
region for infrastructures in sectors such as 
transport, energy, the environment and social issues 
(e.g. construction of schools or hospitals). The NIF 
also supports the private sector particularly through 
risk capital operations targeting Small and Medium-
sized Enterprises. 
ENP countries, 
Russia, Algeria, 
Libya, Syria 
EIB, EBRD, 
CEB, AFD, 
KfW, NIB 
EU-A ITF 
EU-Africa 
Infrastructure 
Trust Fund 
60 + 48,7 EDF 
resources 
grants, 
interest rate 
subsidies, 
Technical 
Assistance 
  Contribute to achieving the strategic objectives of 
the EU-Africa Partnership by funding infrastructure 
in the region. Support fight against poverty, 
sustainable economic growth, social development, 
protection of environment, regional integration 
Sub-Saharan 
African 
countries 
EIB, AfDB 
AIF 
Asia 
Investment 
Facility 
€15 m 2011, 
15m 2012 from 
the EU budget 
Technical 
Assistance, 
interest rate 
subsidies, 
risk capital 
 To promote additional investments in key 
infrastructure with a priority focus on climate 
change relevant and ‘green’ investments in areas of 
environment, energy, as well as SME’s ad social 
infrastructure. 
Asian countries EIB, EBRD, 
NIB, ADB, 
AfD, KfW, 
OeEB, 
SIMEST, 
SOFID 
CIF 
Caribbean 
Investment 
facility 
€40 m 10th EDF 
2012 
Technical 
Assistance, 
interest rate 
subsidies, 
risk capital 
 Contribute to development for strengthening 
regional integration and access to basic social 
services through improvements of physical 
infrastructure and related services, thereby 
supporting several EU cross-cutting themes and 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
ACP Caribbean 
Countries 
EIB, NIB, 
CDB, IDB, 
others joining 
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IFP 
Investment 
Facility for the 
Pacific 
€10 m 10th EDF 
2012 
Technical 
Assistance, 
interest rate 
subsidies, 
risk capital 
 Contribute to development for strengthening 
regional integration and access to basic social 
services through improvements of physical 
infrastructure and related services, thereby 
supporting several EU cross-cutting themes, in 
particular climate change, and Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). 
ACP Pacific 
countries 
EIB, AFD, 
KfW, 
AusAID, 
ADB,NZAID, 
WB 
ACP 
Investment 
Facility 
  
EUR 3.185,5 
million 
(revolving 
fund from EDF 
resources) 
loans, 
equity, 
guarantees; 
blending 
with EIB 
own-
resources 
loans, 
interest rate 
subsidies 
and 
technical 
assistance 
possible 
  Contribute to economic development, particularly of 
the private sector, in the ACP countries  
African, 
Caribbean and 
Pacific States 
(ACP), 
Overseas 
Countries and 
Territories 
(OCT) 
IFI, EIB 
GEEREF 
Global Energy 
Efficiency and 
Renewable 
Energy Fund 
80 EU is 
shareholder 
of the Fund 
providing 
equity and 
technical 
assistance 
current size of 
fund 
108 
target size of 200 
Expansion of RES, EE and other clean energy 
technologies markets and services in developing 
countries and economies in transition. Aims at 
maximising the leverage of public funds through 
investments in regional sub-funds. Objective is to 
promote public and/or private sustainable energy 
partnerships, to encourage technology transfer and 
deployment. 
African, 
Caribbean and 
Pacific States, 
North Africa, 
Eastern 
Europe, Latin 
American and 
Asian countries 
EIF 
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EFSE 
European 
Fund for 
Southeast 
Europe 
about 70 EU is 
shareholder 
of the Fund 
providing 
loans, 
equity, 
guarantees 
size of fund 732  Overall: Provide development finance in Southeast 
Europe, focusing on the needs of micro-enterprises 
and SMEs. Contribute to the strengthening of 
financial sector. Deliver SME, rural and housing 
development products. Specific: Increase access to 
finance for micro-enterprises; Attract private 
investors into the Western Balkans region 
Western 
Balkans, 
Moldova, 
Romania and 
Bulgaria 
EIF 
GGF 
Green for 
Growth Fund 
38.6 in fund 
5 for Technical 
Assistance 
EU is 
shareholder 
of the Fund 
providing  
direct 
lending and 
on-lending 
through 
local 
financial 
institutions,  
additional 
TA Facility 
current size of 
fund  
128 
target size of 
400  
Broadening the financing base of EE and RE 
investments in the target region Increase awareness 
of energy efficiency and small renewable energy 
products among companies and private households 
Contribute to broadening and deepening the 
financial sector servicing those development needs 
Harmonize and coordinate donor initiatives 
Western 
Balkans and 
Turkey 
EIF 
 
Source: Based on information compiled from the EP, EIB and EC. 
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